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Abstract
Determining the profit maximizing input-output bundle of a firm requires data
on prices. This paper shows how endogenously determined shadow prices can be
used in place of actual prices to obtain the optimal input-output bundle where the
firm.s shadow profit is maximized. This approach amounts to an application of the
Weak Axiom of Profit Maximization (WAPM) formulated by Varian (1984) based
on shadow prices rather than actual prices. At these prices the shadow profit of
a firm is zero. Thus, the maximum profit that could have been attained at some
other input-output bundle is a measure of the inefficiency of the firm. Because the
benchmark input-output bundle is always an observed bundle from the data, it can
be determined without having to solve any elaborate programming problem. An
empirical application to U.S. airlines data illustrates the proposed methodology.
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 SHADOW PROFIT MAXIMIZATION AND A GENERALIZED  
MEASURE OF INEFFICIENCY 
 
 In Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) the efficiency of a firm is measured by comparing 
its observed input-output bundle with a reference point on the frontier or the graph of the 
technology. Standard measures of technical efficiency are either input- or output-oriented. In a 
radial input-oriented model one seeks the maximum equi-proportionate reduction in all the inputs 
of a firm that would be possible without violating the feasibility of its output bundle. In the 
output-oriented approach, on the other hand, the objective is to expand all outputs by the same 
factor without using any additional input. When the technology exhibits variable returns to scale, 
the two approaches yield different measures of efficiency. In the case of constant returns to scale, 
although the efficiency measures are identical, the reference bundles for comparison are different. 
In any empirical application one has to choose between an input-oriented and an output-oriented 
model.  
 When input and output prices are available, the reference bundle is one that maximizes 
profit and an inefficient firm attains full efficiency by simultaneously altering its inputs and 
outputs as needed. There are, indeed, several approaches in the DEA literature that allow changes 
in both inputs and outputs in order to obtain the efficient projection of an inefficient input-output 
bundle without the benefit of prices. Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (FGL) (1985) introduced the 
concept of graph efficiency and the corresponding hyperbolic distance function. It is measured by 
the maximum scalar by which all outputs can be expanded and all inputs can be contracted at the 
same time. Chambers, Chung, and Färe (CCF) (1996) introduced the directional distance function 
and the corresponding Nerlove-Luenberger measure of efficiency. Here one seeks to increase all 
outputs and reduce all inputs by the same proportion. In both these approaches, however, a single 
parameter determines how the output bundle is expanded and the input bundle is contracted. Also, 
as in the case of the oriented radial models, the graph hyperbolic and the directional distance 
functions alter all outputs and all inputs equi-proportionately. As a result, slacks may exist in 
individual inputs and/or outputs at the optimal projection.  
 The non-radial Russell efficiency measures defined by Färe and Lovell (1978) do not 
suffer from the problem of slacks. But like the radial measures, they also are either input- or 
output-oriented. Pastor, Ruiz, and Sirvent (1999) introduced a generalized Russell measure that 
allows individual outputs to increase and the individual inputs to decrease by different scale 
factors. As a result, there is no slack in any input or any output at the optimal projection.  
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 In a related strand in the literature, Briec (1997, 1998), Frei and Harker (1998), and Briec 
and Leleu (2003) explore alternative ways to project an observed input-output bundle on to the 
frontier allowing inputs as well as outputs to change simultaneously.  
 In none of these approaches, however, does the reference bundle show an increase in any 
input or a decrease in any output compared to observed input-output bundle of the firm. Yet, 
when the firm maximizes profits the optimal bundle can show either an increase or a decrease in 
any input or output so long as the resulting profit is higher. Determining the profit-maximizing 
bundle of inputs and outputs requires data on the prices faced by the firm under evaluation. This 
paper shows how endogenously determined shadow prices of inputs and outputs of a firm can be 
used in place of actual prices to obtain the optimal projection of its observed input-output bundle 
where its shadow profit is maximized. It can be see from the dual of the relevant DEA model, the 
overall inefficiency of a firm is measured by the difference between the average proportionate 
change in outputs and the average proportionate change in inputs. As shown below, our approach 
amounts to an application of the Weak Axiom of Profit Maximization (WAPM) formulated by 
Varian (1984). But our evaluation is based on the shadow prices rather than actual prices. 
Moreover, the benchmark input-output bundle is always an observed bundle from the data and 
can be determined without having to solve any elaborate programming problem.   
 The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. In section 2 we present the basic nonparametric 
methodology proposed in this paper. Section 3 provides a geometric interpretation of the model 
using a small numerical example for the 1-output, 1-input case. An application with a data set due 
to Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway (1984) is provided in section 4. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. The Nonparametric Methodology 
 
 Consider a data set for N firms from an industry. Let yj be the m-element output vector 
and xj the corresponding n-element input vector of firm j (j = 1,2,…,N).Under the standard 
assumptions of convexity of the technology, free disposability of inputs and outputs, and variable 
returns to scale, an inner approximation to the unobserved production possibility set of this 
industry is 
 .    (1) ∑∑ ∑ =≥=≤≥= N jjN N jjjj NjyyxxyxS
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The efficient input-oriented projection of any observed input-output bundle (x0, y0) is (θ0x0,y0), 
where  
                θ0= min θ : (θx0, y0)  ∈ S.  (2) 
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The corresponding input-oriented measure of technical efficiency is  
 τx0 =θ0.    (2a) 
Similarly, the output-oriented efficient projection is (x0,ϕ0y0), where 
 ϕ0= max ϕ : (x0,ϕ y0)  ∈ S.   (3) 
The output-oriented measure of technical efficiency is 
 τy0  = .01ϕ   (3a) 
Note that employing either (2) or (3) involves a prior judgment on whether expanding outputs or 
contracting inputs is more important in a given context. 
 For FGL’s graph efficiency measure, the efficient projection of   (x0, y0) is 
),( 00010 yx δδ obtained from the hyperbolic distance function 
 .),(:max 0010 Syx ∈= δδδ δ   (4) 
As can be seen for the 1-input, 1-output case, the actual and the projected input-output bundles lie 
on a rectangular hyperbola. Hence, for an efficient projection, δ0 must be greater than or equal to 
unity. Note that here inputs are reduced and outputs are increased simultaneously.
 Another measure of graph efficiency based on simultaneous change in inputs and outputs 
is the Nerlove-Luenberger efficiency measure that is derived from CCF’s directional distance 
function  
  ( ) .)1(,)1(:max 000 Syx ∈+−= ββββ   (5) 
In both (4) and (5), however, a single parameter determines how both inputs and outputs change. 
 Now suppose that we had information on the output and input prices for the firm under 
review. Specifically, assume that p0 and w0 were the output and input price vectors, respectively. 
In that case, the optimal projection of the observed input output bundle would be 
satisfying the inequality ),( 0*
0
* yx
     (6) .),('''' 000*
00
*
0 Syxxwypxwyp ∈∀−≥−
Define  and A measure of the inefficiency of the 
firm is Note that in order to get to the profit-efficient projection, the firm does not 
increase all of its outputs or decrease all of its inputs by the same proportion. In fact, it may 
increase or reduce individual inputs or outputs appropriately so long as the resulting bundle 
maximizes profit. 
0
*
00
*
00
* '' xwyp −≡π .'' 00000 xwyp −≡π
.00*
0 ππ −=∆
 It is interesting to note that the maximum profit can be easily obtained as 
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   (7) { } ).,...,2,1(''max 000* Njxwypj jj =−=π
Suppose that for a given data set 
 for j =1,2,…,N.             (7a) jjkk xwypxwyp '''' 0000 −≥−
Then, for any set of non-negative λjs adding up to unity, 
  .''''
1
0
1
000 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛≥− ∑∑ jN jjN jkk xwypxwyp λλ
But, by assumption, for any (x, y) ∈ S, there exist some non-negative λjs adding up to unity such 
that 
 and . ∑≤ N jj yy
1
λ ∑≥ N jj xx
1
λ
Hence, 
 for all (x, y)∈ S. (7b) jjkk xwypxwyp '''' 0000 −≥−
Varian’s Weak Axiom of Profit Maximization (WAPM) argues that if the input-output bundle of 
a particular firm evaluated at the prices it faces yields a lower profit than what could be earned if 
it had chosen the observed input-output bundle of some other firm in the sample, then the firm 
under consideration could not be maximizing profit.  An implication of (7a-b) above is that if the 
firm k does satisfy WAPM then it actually is maximizing profit over the production possibility set 
S.  Further, (7) can also be expressed as 
    (8) 
).,...,2,1(''..
min
00
0
*
Njxwypts jj =−≥
=
π
ππ
 
 Lacking the necessary price information we cannot take this approach. We may, 
however, use endogenously determined shadow prices to look for the input-output bundle that 
maximizes profit over the entire production possibility set S at these prices. Consider some output 
price vector u0 and input price vector v0 such that at these prices the input-output bundle (x0, y0) 
yields zero profit. That is 
       (9) .0'' 0000 =− xvyu
 
We now look for the optimal bundle (x*, y*) such that 
 
    (10) .),('''' 00*0*0* SyxxvyuxvyuP ∈∀−≥−≡
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 The maximum profit P* provides a measure of the overall inefficiency of the firm producing y0 
from x0. One problem that remains, however, is that one can change the shadow prices of inputs 
and output by the same proportion and P* also changes by the same proportion without violating 
the requirement of zero profit at the observed input-output bundle. As a result, the maximum 
shadow profit P* would be unbounded. One way to overcome this problem is to normalize the 
shadow prices separately1 so that  
    (11) .1'' 0000 == xvyu
 
Following (8), the shadow profit maximization for the firm under review can be specified as 
 min  P  
s.t.          (12) 
;0;0
;1'
;1'
),..,2,1(;''
00
00
00
00
≥≥
=
=
=≤−
vu
xv
yu
NjPxvyu jj
             P unrestricted. 
The dual of this linear programming problem is 
 
 max  θϕ −  
s.t.       ∑     (13) ≥N jj yy
1
0 ;ϕλ
                 
∑
∑
=
≤
N
j
N
j
j xx
1
1
0
;1
;
λ
θλ
             ;0≥jλ φ, θ  unrestricted. 
Note that (13) combines the features of both the output- and the input-oriented radial models for a 
variable returns to scale technology. In fact, setting θ equal to unity, we get the measure of the 
firm’s output-oriented inefficiency, (φ- 1). Similarly, when φ is preset at unity, the model yields 
                                                 
1 In the standard DEA models in the multiplier form, shadow prices of either the inputs or the outputs (but 
not both) are normalized so that the shadow cost or the shadow revenue of the firm under evaluation equals 
unity. 
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the firm’s input-oriented inefficiency, (1- θ). Thus, the optimal value of the objective function in 
(13) is the sum of its output- and input-oriented technical inefficiencies. 
 One problem with the normalization of the shadow prices of output and inputs specified 
in (11) above is that when multiple outputs or multiple inputs are involved, individual shadow 
prices may be zero at the optimal solution of  (12) leading to positive output or input slacks at the 
optimal projection of (x0, y0) obtained from (13). One possible way to resolve this problem is to 
replace the restrictions in (11) by 
  mrr yu 1
00 =  for each output r (r =1,2,...,m)                (14a) 
and                        nii xv 1
00 =  for each input i (i =1,2,...,n)                (14b) 
What (14a) implies is that outputs are so priced that each shares equally in the shadow value of 
the output. Similarly, (14b) ensures that the share of each input is equal in the total shadow cost. 
For the 1-output, 1-input case, of course, (14a-b) and (11) are equivalent. The revised form of the 
problem (12) is 
  min  P  
s.t.        
),...,2,1;,...,2,1(;0;0
);,...,2,1(;
);,...,2,1(;
),..,2,1(;1
00
100
100
0
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==≥≥
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  (15) 
             P unrestricted. 
 
Although the normalization in (14a-b) appears to be rather ad hoc, its intuitive meaning can be 
see from the following dual of this problem in (15): 
max ∑∑ − n inm rm
1
1
1
1 θϕ  
s.t.       ∑     (16) =≥N rrjrj mryy
1
0 );,...,2,1(;ϕλ
                 
∑
∑
=
=≤
N
j
N
ii
j
ij nixx
1
1
0
;1
);,...,2,1(;
λ
θλ
             ;0≥jλ φr, θi   (r=1,2,…,m; i=1,2,…,n) unrestricted. 
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Clearly (16) combines the features of both output- and input-oriented non-radial models of 
measuring Russell efficiency. An implication of the way we restrict the shadow prices of outputs 
and inputs in (14a-b) is that each output specific scale factors )( jϕ is weighted equally in the 
objective function. Similarly, each input scale factor )( iθ  is also given the same weight.   
Problem (16) above has an apparent similarity with the arbitrarily weighted non-radial models 
considered by Zhu (1996) and Athanassopoulos, Lambroukos, and Seiford (1999). There are 
fundamental differences, however. First, the model introduced here allows inputs and outputs to 
increase or decrease so long as the average increase in output exceeds the average increase in 
inputs. More importantly, however, while the weights in the other models are arbitrarily specified 
offering no economic intuition, we start with the objective of shadow profit maximization and 
arrive at the dual problem shown in (16). 
 Pastor, Ruiz, and Sirvent (1999) introduced an extended Russell measure of efficiency 
defined as 
                     
∑
∑
=Γ m
rm
n
in
1
1
1
1
ϕ
θ
.   (17) 
As shown in Ray (2004), a linear approximation to Г in (17) at all φr and θi equal to unity is , 
∑∑ − m rmn in
1
1
1
1 ϕθ .This is the objective function in (16). 
 A remarkable feature of this model is its computational simplicity. The optimal solution 
can be obtained through a simple enumeration process without any need to solve any elaborate 
programming problem. As argued above, the optimal value of the objective function in (15) is 
attained at some observed input-output bundle (xk, yk) in the sample. Further, by virtue of the 
restrictions on the shadow prices, 
 0
0 1
r
r my
u = for each output r and (17a) 
            0
0 1
i
i nx
v =  for each input i.  (17b) 
Thus,  .1
1 1
0
1
0
10
1
0 ∑ ∑∑∑ −=− m n
i
j
i
n
r
j
r
m
n
i
j
ii
m
j
rr x
x
y
yxvyu   (18) 
Define 0
r
j
rj
r y
y=ϕ (r=1,2,…,m) and 0
i
j
ij
i x
x=θ  (i=1,2,…,n). Then, 
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1 1
110
1
0 ∑ ∑∑∑ −=− m n jinjrmn
i
j
ii
m
j
rr xvyu θϕ   (19) 
Clearly, all we need to do is to evaluate the expression on the right hand side of (18) at the 
observed data points to obtain the optimal value of the objective functions in (15) and (16). The 
corresponding input-output bundle represents the relevant efficient projection of the bundle (x0, 
y0) on to the graph of the technology. 
 
3. A Geometric Interpretation: The 1-input, 1-output Case 
 
Consider a sample of firms from an industry producing a single output, y, from a single input, x. 
Evaluated at the (actual or imputed) input and output prices (w0, p0) the profit from any input-
output bundle (x, y) is 
 Π = p0y – w0x. 
Thus, all input-output bundles (x, y) satisfying 
 xy
p
w
p 0
0
0
0 += Π  
lead to the same profit Π0 and, therefore, lie on the same iso-profit line. A firm maximizes profit 
at prices (w0, p0) by selecting an input-output bundle within its production possibility set that lies 
on the highest iso-profit line with slope .0
0
p
w  Of course, when market prices are not available, one 
has to use the shadow prices for profit maximization as described above. This may be illustrated 
with the following example. 
Figure 1 shows the input-output quantities of 6 firms represented by the points A through 
F and the broken line GACDF-extension is the frontier or graph of the technology empirically 
constructed from these observed input-output bundles. Points B and E lie below the frontier and 
are thus technically inefficient. All the other points (A, C, D, and F) are technically efficient by 
the conventional measure.  But that is true only because we do not allow any increase in the input 
even if that results in an increase in the output. In the present case, however, we allow the input 
and output to change in any direction so long as then shadow profit of the firm increases. 
Consider, for example, the input-output bundle A. Shadow prices (p0=¼, w0=¼)  the shadow 
profit for this firm is 0 and the iso-profit line is the ray ORA  (with slope equal to unity) through 
the point A. The highest iso-profit line parallel to ORA that can be attained at any point in the 
production possibility set is the line MN through the point C. Next we consider the point B. For 
this input-output bundle the zero profit line is the ray ORB with slope equal to ½. This time the 
highest attainable iso-profit line is KL through the point D. 
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Table 1 shows the input-output quantities of the different firms used in this example along with 
their respective shadow-profit efficient projections on to the frontier. Several points may be 
underscored in this context. The only point with no overall inefficiency (i.e., zero shadow profit) 
is the point C.. The iso-profit line through C is also a tangent to the production frontier at that 
point. It is the most productive scale size (MPSS) characterized by locally constant returns to 
 
 
Figure 1: Shadow Profit Maximization 
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scale. As one would expect, the tangent hyperplane at this point has a zero intercept (see Banker, 
Charnes, and Cooper (1984)). The overall efficient projection of the point B is D and not C. Being  
                 
`   Table 1. Data and Summary Results for Hypothetical Firms 
Firm Input  (x) Output (y) Reference     Φ*      Θ*       Π*
       
A 4 4       C 2.4 2 0.4 
B 6 3       D 5 2 3 
C 8 12       C 1 1 0 
D 12 15       C 0.8 0.67 0.13 
E 14 10       D 1.5 0.8571 0.6429 
F 16 16       C 0.75 0.5 0.25 
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the point of maximum average productivity, the point C would result in the maximum value of 
the ratio of φ and θ. But the objective function of (16) in this 1-input, 1-output example is the 
difference between φ and θ, which is maximized at the point D. If instead, B had been projected 
on to C, the resulting values of φ and θ would be 2 and 1.33, respectively, and the objective 
function value would be 0.67. Similar reasoning applies to point E as well. What is interesting is 
that the point D itself is not shadow-profit efficient when evaluated at its own shadow prices.  As 
can be seen from Table 1, points A and F also are not shadow profit efficient even though they are 
Pareto efficient without any slack in either input or output. 
 
4. A Study of U.S. Airlines 
In this section we present an application of the procedure proposed in this paper to a data 
set for a number of U.S. airlines from the year 1984 analyzed before by Kumbhakar (1990) and 
Ray and Mukherjee (1996). A single output, five-input technology is considered at the DEA 
stage. The data form a subset of a larger data set constructed by Caves, Christensen, and 
Tretheway (1984). The output is a quantity index (QYI) constructed from the numbers revenue 
passenger miles flown, ton-miles of cargo flown, and ton-miles of mail flown. The inputs are 
quantity indexes of labor (QLI), fuel (QFI), materials (QMI), flight equipment (QFLI), and 
ground equipment (QGRI). Corresponding price indexes for the output and the individual input 
categories were constructed from the revenue and expenditure information for the individual 
airlines. Detailed accounts of the data were constructed are provided in Tretheway and Windle 
(1983) and Caves et al (1984). The input and output quantity and price data for the individual 
airlines are reported in Tables 2a and 2b, respectively. In this particular case, we do have the 
information on the prices of the inputs and the output for the individual firms and can directly 
find out the profit maximizing input-output bundle for each airline in our sample. Nevertheless, 
we follow the shadow profit maximization approach proposed above to obtain the corresponding 
efficient projection of the input-output bundles of the individual firms in our sample. These are 
then compared with the corresponding bundles that maximize the actual profits of these firms. 
We first solved the profit maximization problem for each airline using the actual prices 
reported in Table 2b. Somewhat surprisingly, none of the airlines in the sample was found to be 
maximizing profit at the prices it faced. As noted before, the maximum profit over the free 
disposal convex hull of the data points is attained at the observed input-output bundle of one of 
the firms in the sample. In the present example, as shown in Table 3, for each airline in our 
sample, one out of three firms – North West (NW), People’s Express (PE), and United (UN) – 
proved to be the profit maximizing reference point. Of these, the input-output bundle of North 
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West (NW) would maximize the profit for 13 of the 17 price vectors of the individual firms. 
United (UN) would maximize profit at the prices of three airlines- Piedmont (PI), Republic 
Hughes Air (RHA) and US Air (USA). People’s Express (PE) maximizes profit at the prices of 
North West (NW). Interestingly, none maximizes profit at its own prices. 
Table 4 reports the actual revenue, cost, and profit along with the maximum profit that an 
airline could earn for each of the airlines separately. We note in passing that the actual profit is 
negative for 15 out of the 17 firms in the sample. The maximum profit (shown in the column 
(Max-profit), however, would be positive for all but 2 airlines (North West (NW) and Pam 
American (PA)). The amount of profit lost due to inefficiency is measured by the difference 
between the actual and the maximum profit and is shown as (Lost Profit). We deflate this amount 
of lost profit by the actual cost of each airline to obtain the lost return on outlay shown in the last 
column of Table 4. Thus, even though North West shows a large amount of loss and would 
continue to incur losses even if selected the most profitable bundle at the applicable input-output 
prices, it actually is loss due to inefficiency is only 14 cents per dollar of outlay. On the other 
hand, although Piedmont (PI) and South West (SW) are actually earning positive profit, 
compared to what they could earn by selecting the profit maximizing bundles, the amounts of 
return per dollar of outlay lost due to inefficiency are $2.59 for Piedmont (PI) and $1.84 for South 
West (SW). 
Results from the shadow profit maximization problem are reported in table 5. This time 
North West (NW) serves as the reference firm for 12 of the 17 airlines while United (UN) is the 
reference point for the remaining 5. In this case, North West (NW) is shadow profit efficient but 
United (UN) is not. The columns φ* and θ*1 through θ*5 are the output and corresponding input 
scale (change) factors that would project the actual output and input bundle of a firm on to its 
shadow profit efficient reference point. The column P* shows the shadow profit that is lost by a 
firm due to inappropriate choice of inputs and output. It should be noted in this context that by 
construction, the shadow cost of the actual input bundle employed is unity and the shadow profit 
from the observed input-output bundle of a firm is 0. This, P* itself is a measure of the shadow 
profit lost per unit of the shadow cost of any airline. By this criterion, Ozark (OZ) is the most 
inefficient followed by Pacific South (PS). The next group of inefficient airlines consists of 
Piedmont (PI), Frontier (FR), and US Air (USA) in that order. Two other airlines with 
considerable inefficiency are South West (SW) and Republic Hughes Air (RHA). At the other 
end, North West (NW) shows no inefficiency. Among the others, United (UN), Pan American 
(PA), and American (AM) have the lowest levels of inefficiency, in that order. 
 11
For a head to head comparison of the (in)efficiency measures of the individual airlines we 
have pulled together the relevant columns from Tables 3, 4, and 5 in Table 6. In 13 out of the 17 
cases, the same in airline was found to be the reference point on the frontier for both actual profit 
maximization and shadow profit maximization. In 11 of these cases, the reference firm was North 
West (NW). In the remaining 2, it was United (UN).  There is thus a broad agreement between 
the findings from the alternative approaches.  In fact, comparison of the lost (actual and shadow) 
returns on outlay further demonstrates the similarity in the findings. In fact, in no case are the two 
measures of inefficiency grossly inconsistent. Even in the case of North West (NW) which is 
found to be efficient by the shadow (but not by the actual) profit measure, the actual  profit lost is 
a modest 14 cents per dollar of outlay. At the other end, the two most inefficient airlines Ozark 
(OZ) and Pacific South (PS) show comparable measures of lost returns (3.05 for the actual and 
4.07 for the shadow profits lost) from broth criteria. In fact, the simple correlation between the 
two is as high as 0.928 and the coefficient of rank correlation is even higher at 0.985. 
 We conclude the section with a caveat. When reliable data on output and input prices are 
available, one should apply the criterion of actual profit maximization in order to determine the 
efficient projection of the actual input-output bundle of a firm on to the frontier. When prices are 
not known, the present approach of shadow profit maximization offers a reasonable alternative. In 
this application, we had an opportunity to compare the results from the alternative approaches 
because price data were actually available. While it is, in deed, reassuring that the results agree 
quite closely, there is no basis for generalization of this agreement.                                
5.Conclusion 
This paper offers a measure of overall inefficiency of a firm based on the criterion of 
shadow profit maximization. Unlike in the existing radial or non-radial DEA models in the 
literature, in this approach inputs and outputs are allowed to either increase or decrease as 
appropriate for optimization. In fact, an input-output bundle that is Pareto efficient without any 
slack in either inputs or outputs may be evaluated as inefficient by the shadow profit criterion.   
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             Table 2a. Input-Output Quantity Indexes: Selected US Airlines for the year 
1984  
Airline Output Labor Fuel Material 
Flight 
Capital 
Ground 
Capital 
  QYI QLI QFI QMI QFLI QGRI 
American (AM) 1.9365 1.2637 1.3036 2.209 1.5932 2.1644 
Continental (COT) 0.5455 0.3078 0.3906 0.6076 0.4916 0.4303 
Delta (DE) 1.3897 1.2116 1.123 1.7274 1.2238 1.7945 
Eastern (EA) 1.5157 1.2891 1.1765 1.9574 1.6191 1.444 
Frontier (FR) 0.2133 0.1723 0.1524 0.3031 0.2069 0.1961 
Northwest (NW) 1.2485 0.4998 0.7906 1.224 1.2125 0.6194 
Ozark (OZ) 0.1387 0.1347 0.1236 0.226 0.1826 0.1266 
PanAmerican (PA) 1.5685 0.9195 0.9764 1.7506 1.4026 1.2589 
Peoples( PE) 0.3277 0.1438 0.2154 0.3438 0.2924 0.2064 
Piedmont( PI) 0.304 0.325 0.3004 0.4835 0.3228 0.2591 
PacificSouth (PS) 0.155 0.124 0.1168 0.2176 0.1986 0.2274 
Republic-HughesAir 
(RHA) 0.4332 0.4685 0.4369 0.6832 0.6375 0.3107 
SouthWest (SW) 0.1997 0.131 0.1806 0.1987 0.1796 0.1587 
TWA  (TWA) 1.5134 0.8959 0.9349 1.7681 1.3134 1.5457 
United (UN) 2.4424 1.484 1.5965 2.4479 2.1049 2.7084 
USAir (USA) 0.4214 0.4134 0.374 0.6453 0.5468 0.4883 
Western (WE) 0.4933 0.3509 0.3547 0.5251 0.4229 0.3141 
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                                       Table 2b. Output and Input Price Indexes: Selected US Airlines for 1984                     
     Airline Output Labor Fuel Materials 
Flight 
Capital 
Ground 
Capital 
 PY PL PF PM PFL PGR 
American(AM) 2419225 1252053 823391 780312.4 539857.9 86158.31 
Continental(COT) 2098122 654243 843951.3 780097.8 526746.3 86153.19 
Delta(DE) 3173110 1281531 821327.6 780109.4 520848.8 86154.19 
Eastern(EA) 2781221 1060688 814236.9 780312.9 529472.4 86154.06 
Frontier(FR) 2698588 1083174 844862.8 775926.3 532153.9 86159.31 
Northwest(NW) 1952129 1117723 860378.3 780072.3 569012.9 86149.94 
Ozark(OZ) 3302877 1137825 819571.5 776092.3 542749.3 86178.56 
PanAmerican(PA) 2072299 1109509 867325.3 780098.3 570737.3 86154.19 
Peoples(PE) 1782716 610426.1 825227.8 775971.6 534526.6 86165.94 
Piedmont(PI) 3697954 938470.6 819421.1 775984 504924.9 86157.63 
PacificSouth(PS) 3202013 1204671 834531.1 776089.4 537267.1 86145.75 
Republic-
HughesAir(RHA) 3482475 984645.1 828228.9 776019.8 538885.8 86161 
SouthWest(SW) 2675433 916764.9 808326.4 775898.5 530197.8 86165.5 
TWA 2212803 1259548 835999.5 780323 539058.2 86155.25 
United(UN) 2364884 1246253 831375.1 780317.9 541706.6 86155.88 
USAir(USA) 3781303 1285977 831339.5 775920.2 537154.9 86151.44 
Western(WE) 2290557 1084819 844183.7 780061.1 534464.4 86144.31 
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Table 3. Profit Efficient Projections of Sample Firms 
Airline  Reference Airline 
  NW PE UN 
American (AM) 1 0 0
Continental (COT) 1 0 0
Delta (DE) 1 0 0
Eastern (EA) 1 0 0
Frontier (FR) 1 0 0
Northwest (NW) 0 1 0
Ozark (OZ) 1 0 0
PanAmerican (PA) 1 0 0
Peoples( PE) 1 0 0
Piedmont( PI) 0 0 1
PacificSouth (PS) 1 0 0
Republic-HughesAir 
(RHA) 0 0 1
SouthWest (SW) 1 0 0
TWA  (TWA) 1 0 0
United (UN) 1 0 0
USAir (USA) 0 0 1
Western (WE) 1 0 0
 
Note: an entry 1 in any column identifies the relevant airline as the reference firm for the airline 
shown in the corresponding row.
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        Table 4.  Actual and Optimal Profits and Related Data for Individual Airlines 
   Airline Revenue Cost Profit 
Max-
Profit 
Lost 
Profit 
Lost 
Rate of 
Return 
American (AM) 4684829 5425885 -741055 370485.3 1111541 0.204859 
Continental (COT) 1144526 1301031 -156505 445493.1 601998.5 0.462709 
Delta (DE) 4409671 4614633 -204962 1312839 1517801 0.32891 
Eastern (EA) 4215497 4834342 -618846 991997.9 1610844 0.333208 
Frontier (FR) 575608.8 677569.7 -101961 851018.1 952979 1.406466 
Northwest (NW) 2437233 2936951 -499718 -86799.1 412918.9 0.140594 
Ozark (OZ) 458109 539977.1 -81868.1 1564978 1646846 3.049844 
Pan American (PA) 3250401 4141666 -891265 -14498.6 876766.1 0.211694 
Peoples( PE) 584196 706392.6 -122197 90560.75 212757.3 0.301188 
Piedmont( PI) 1124178 1111658 12519.54 2889013 2876493 2.587569 
Pacific South (PS) 496312 542020.3 -45708.3 1383624 1429332 2.637045 
Republic-Hughes Air (RHA) 1508608 1723646 -215038 2193609 2408646 1.397414 
South West (SW) 534284 529149 5134.992 978680.9 973545.9 1.839833 
TWA  (TWA) 3348856 4130863 -782007 100000.3 882007.5 0.213517 
United (UN) 5775993 6460453 -684460 300039.4 984499.5 0.152389 
USAir (USA) 1593441 1679029 -85588.1 2437779 2523367 1.502873 
Western (WE) 1129932 1342788 -212856 335861.8 548718 0.408641 
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            Table 5. Shadow Price Efficient Projections and Overall Inefficiency of  Sample Airlines 
Airline Reference Airlines      
  NW UN φ* θ*L θ*F θ*M θ*FL θ*GR P**
American (AM) 1 0 0.64472 0.606474 0.286176 0.395505 0.761047 0.554097 0.12406 
Continental (COT) 1 0 2.288726 2.024066 1.439461 1.623782 2.466436 2.014483 0.37508 
Delta (DE) 0 1 1.757502 1.421638 1.509278 1.224827 1.719971 1.417101 0.298939 
Eastern (EA) 1 0 0.823712 0.671993 0.428947 0.387712 0.748873 0.625319 0.251143 
Frontier (FR) 1 0 5.853258 5.187664 3.158593 2.900754 5.860319 4.038271 1.624138 
Northwest (NW) 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Ozark (OZ) 0 1 17.60923 12.91667 21.39336 11.01707 11.52738 10.83142 4.072048 
Pan American (PA) 1 0 0.795983 0.809709 0.492017 0.543556 0.864466 0.699189 0.114196 
Peoples( PE) 1 0 3.809887 3.670381 3.000969 3.475661 4.146717 3.560209 0.2391 
Piedmont( PI) 0 1 8.034211 5.314581 10.45311 4.566154 6.520756 5.062875 1.650716 
Pacific South (PS) 0 1 15.75742 13.66866 11.91029 11.96774 10.59869 11.24954 3.878434 
Republic-Hughes Air (RHA) 1 0 2.882041 1.809567 1.993563 1.066809 1.901961 1.791569 1.169347 
South West (SW) 1 0 6.251878 4.37763 3.902962 3.815267 6.751114 6.16004 1.250475 
TWA  (TWA) 1 0 0.824964 0.845652 0.400725 0.557875 0.923176 0.692269 0.141024 
United (UN) 1 0 0.511178 0.495208 0.228696 0.336792 0.576037 0.50002 0.083827 
USAir (USA) 0 1 5.795918 4.268717 5.54659 3.589744 3.849488 3.793429 1.586325 
Western (WE) 1 0 2.530914 2.228926 1.971983 1.424337 2.867108 2.330985 0.366246 
Note: See under Table 3. 
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 Table 6. Comparison of Inefficiencies  of Airlines based on Actual and Shadow Profit Maximization 
  At Acatual Prices  At Shadow Prices  
Airline  Reference Airlines  Reference Airlines  
  NW PE UN 
Lost Rate of 
Return (Actual) NW UN 
Lost 
Shadow 
Return 
American (AM) 1 0 0 0.204859 1 0 0.12406 
Continental (COT) 1 0 0 0.462709 1 0 0.37508 
Delta (DE) 1 0 0 0.32891 0 1 0.298939 
Eastern (EA) 1 0 0 0.333208 1 0 0.251143 
Frontier (FR) 1 0 0 1.406466 1 0 1.624138 
Northwest (NW) 0 1 0 0.140594 1 0 0 
Ozark (OZ) 1 0 0 3.049844 0 1 4.072048 
PanAmerican (PA) 1 0 0 0.211694 1 0 0.114196 
Peoples( PE) 1 0 0 0.301188 1 0 0.2391 
Piedmont( PI) 0 0 1 2.587569 0 1 1.650716 
PacificSouth (PS) 1 0 0 2.637045 0 1 3.878434 
Republic-HughesAir 
(RHA) 0 0 1 1.397414 1 0 1.169347 
SouthWest (SW) 1 0 0 1.839833 1 0 1.250475 
TWA  (TWA) 1 0 0 0.213517 1 0 0.141024 
United (UN) 1 0 0 0.152389 1 0 0.083827 
USAir (USA) 0 0 1 1.502873 0 1 1.586325 
Western (WE) 1 0 0 0.408641 1 0 0.366246 
Note: See under Table 3. 
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